The response to the Haiti Earthquake in 2010 has been declared the largest humanitarian operation ever carried out in a single country. Efficiently allocating scarce resources for responding to such type of massive disaster has proven to be extremely challenging. This paper identifies areas where applied operations research can have a significant impact in supporting large scale humanitarian operations. We describe the immediate response to the Haiti Earthquake focusing on five clusters: logistics, health, food, shelter and non-food items, and water, sanitation and hygiene. In each case we specify the on the ground situation, the operational objective, the key decision problems, the main bottlenecks and the outcome of the response operation. Finally, we provide recommendations on conducting research with humanitarian organizations based on over ten years of experience.
Introduction
The Haiti earthquake which occurred on January 12 th 2010, at 16h53 local time, measured 7.0 magnitude on the Richter scale. The massive level of destruction caused by the seism imposed tremendous operational challenges on the humanitarian agencies and governments committed to responding. Initial reports sent via e-mail by survivors suggested a huge number of casualties and widespread damage. Electricity, phone networks and access to water were severely disrupted. The IFRC (a glossary of all acronyms used in this paper can be found in Appendix 1) highlighted the urgent need for access, search and rescue, medical facilities and supplies, clean water and sanitation, food, emergency shelter, logistics and telecommunications in order to establish "the largest humanitarian operation ever carried out in a single country" analyze the search and rescue effort and the security issues which were a key component of the humanitarian response operation during the first 7 days following the earthquake. Our objective is to highlight the critical issues that impacted the response, and formulate them such as to illustrate the value that OR can bring to these operations. In this respect, we specify: 1) the on the ground situation; 2) the operational objective; 3) the key decision problems; 4) the main bottlenecks; and 5) the outcome of the response operation.
The paper identifies areas where applied OR can have a significant impact in supporting international humanitarian operations. However, in order to be applicable this research must be in line with the real needs facing humanitarian decision makers.
For instance, humanitarian organizations have different objectives and face more severe bottlenecks than a company operating in less volatile environments. To this end, the paper also provides recommendations on conducting research with humanitarian organizations, based on over 10 years of experience.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 1 provides a brief overview of existing literature on disaster lifecycle management and humanitarian logistics.
Section 2 describes the state of Haiti's low level of preparedness. Section 3 examines the cluster activation and response set up in the five categories highlighted previously.
Section 4 provides key recommendations for carrying out research with the humanitarian sector. Section 5 outlines the mains conclusions of the paper.
2 Brief literature discussion Carter (1991) identifies six phases in the cycle of a disaster: preparedness, impact, response, recovery, development and mitigation. Norman's framework (2003) includes prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery and development. Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009) refer to preparedness, response, mitigation and rehabilitation.
The growing body of OR literature on humanitarian logistics focuses on the disaster lifecycle stages of preparedness and response. Most models deal specifically with preparedness and response regarding victim evacuation and aid delivery. Some models for victim evacuation can be found in Sherali et al (1991) , Pidd et al (1996) , Barbarosoglu et al (2002) , Han et al (2006) , Yi and Ozdamar (2007) , Chiu and Zheng (2007) , Regnier (2008) , Stepanov and Smith (2009), and Saadatseresht et al (2009) .
The objective of evacuation models is to efficiently plan the relocation of the human population from dangerous to safe areas given the threat or realization of a disastrous event. Evacuation is costly and in the case of foreseen threats it must be decided on the basis of noisy signals (Regnier 2008) . The OR literature on evacuation planning minimizes distance travelled, clearance time and congestion of evacuation routes.
Models for aid distribution have been developed by Long and Wood (1995) , Viswanath and Peeta (2003) , Ozdamar et al (2004) , Barbarosoglu and Arda (2004) , Craft et al (2005) , Miller et al (2006) , Jia et al (2007) , Sheu (2007) , Tzeng et al (2007) , Yi and Kumar (2007) , Campbell et al (2008) , Balzik et al (2008) , Lodree and Taskin (2008) , Beraldi and Bruni (2009) and Lee et al (2009) . With the objectives of minimizing time to respond or maximizing demand coverage, aid distribution models often plan the assignment of a set of aid assets or services to stochastic demand points using an available transportation network that is a function of predefined impact scenarios.
Most of these papers deal with decision making at strategic and tactical levels in terms of facility location, inventory management and transportation management.
In this paper we also highlight the potential of OR to analyze operational problems.
These kinds of problems are the ones faced by relief workers during the first weeks of response, henceforth referred to as the immediate response phase. Figure 1 illustrates the section of the response operation we are referring to.
Figure1: Humanitarian response operations -planning, preparedness, and response
Preparedness: before time zero
At the time of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the population of the country had surpassed 9 million inhabitants. Of these, 80% were living on less than $2 per day and the unemployment rate was running at above 70% (UN.org). Haiti was the poorest country in the western hemisphere and was still recovering from the impact of recent high intensity hurricanes including Dean and Noel in 2007 , Gustav, Hanna, Ike in 2008 and Jeanne, also in 2008 , which killed more than 3,000 people in the north of the Country.
Haitian local infrastructure was typified by poor quality and insufficiency.
Most of the buildings in Haiti had no foundations, and had been built with heavy materials such as bricks, concrete, wood and clay roof tiles. Of the 4,160 Km of road in the country, 76% were unpaved (CIA World Fact Book). Furthermore, only 50% of the population had permanent access to clean water according to the IFRC. As a result of these problems, there were many humanitarian organizations present working on relief and development programs at the time of the earthquake. Haiti's infrastructural and socio-economic situation rendered the country particularly ill-prepared to cope with the impact of a major earthquake. Responding to this disaster required massive involvement of the international community. The next section examines the immediate response phase (figure 1) of this humanitarian operation. In particular, it focuses on the activation of the humanitarian cluster system and setting up the response.
Cluster activation and response set up
This section identifies the main operational challenges facing international humanitarian organizations in setting up the response to the Haiti earthquake. This major urban disaster resulted in specific bottlenecks and a more dependent local population than seen in a rural context. Humanitarian organizations are not as familiar with these types of disaster, as can be seen in the complications that also arose following Hurricane Katrina. With increased rates of urbanization around the globe, the frequency of urban disasters is likely to increase, bringing new challenges to disaster response in terms of the spread of diseases, security and warehousing capacity, to name some examples.
We focus on search and rescue and five of the humanitarian clusters: access and logistics; health; water, sanitation and hygiene; food aid; and shelter and non-food items, as well as security issues. Cluster leads have been assigned to each of the clusters to help facilitate coordination of the response. The cluster system is generally activated in the event of major disasters that exceed local capability and require a multi-sector response and a wide range of actors. In Haiti for example, OCHA reports between 20 to 50 agencies working with the cluster system, either as a partner organization or through attendance at meetings (OCHA 16/01/2010). In fact, these numbers could be even higher, adding to the challenge of coordinating the response. Coordination of the cluster response is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in terms of the overall response operation, it does present a valuable area for future research.
Search and rescue (SAR)
Due to the impact of the earthquake, approximately 75% of the buildings in Port-au-Prince were destroyed or badly damaged (IFRC 31/01/2010). During the critical time window of 72 hours of emergency search and rescue managed by humanitarian organizations, the operational objective was to rescue as many survivors as possible. The immediate response phase usually relies heavily on locals or on people already on the ground. In this specific case, so many people were killed, missing, or trying to cope with traumas in their immediate circle, that they were not in a position to provide the initial response. This added to the already significant bottlenecks facing the humanitarian response operation. With a limited number of SAR teams in the field and a lack of heavy lifting equipment some critical decision problems were: 1) how to optimally deploy the rescue teams in a vast geographic area including the cities of Port-au-Prince, Leogane (80-90% of buildings destroyed) Carrefour (40-50% of buildings destroyed) and Jacmel; and 2) how and where to transport rescued patients with grave traumatic injuries and urgent surgery needs to maximize their chances of survival.
The first SAR teams were composed of humanitarian staff present in the field that had survived the earthquake. International SAR teams began to arrive in Haiti on January 14 th , and 26 SAR teams were on the ground and deployed by January 15 th .
The main bottlenecks facing these teams were; the lack of equipment with which to conduct the search; the limited availability of transportation equipment, or routes to transfer people for treatment, and crucially, the lack of functioning medical facilities.
SAR teams were deployed to densely populated areas, public buildings and hospitals. At the peak of the SAR operation there were 67 Urban Search and Rescue teams in Haiti consisting of 1,918 staff and 160 dogs (IFRC 27/01/2010). The search and rescue phase was declared over by the government on January 22 nd . In total 211
people were rescued by international and national search and rescue teams (OCHA 08/02/2010).
Access and logistics
The seism rendered most of the transportation network non operational. It destroyed
Port-au-Prince seaport and partially blocked the main roads to the city coming from the seaport, airport and Dominican Republic. The control tower of the airport was not functional, but its only runway, with capacity up to Boeing 757 and standing room for 18 planes (IFRC 19/01/2010), was operational with radio assisted, line-of-sight landings only. The refueling capacity was damaged (OCHA 13/01/2010). At this stage, the operational objective of the immediate response operation was to maximize access to the local population to deliver urgently required food and non-food items.
Some of the critical decision problems faced by the relief operation regarding access were: 1) how to prioritize the use of ramp space at the airport; 2) how to efficiently plan the use of heavy lifting equipment to clear the roads; 3) how to minimize fuel consumption in a road network with uncertain road blockages; and 4) how to prioritize repair efforts to guarantee access by the sea in the presence of dynamic and noisy seaport capacity assessments.
However, those responsible for the operation faced serious bottlenecks. Use of the airport was limited to military and humanitarian flights exclusively. During the first three days of response, the number of flights increased from 13 up to 100 per day. During the fourth day of operations, the pipeline of planes waiting for landing became an issue. The number of flights landing in Port-au-Prince airport increased to a peak of 160 per day between the first 7 to 14 days of the response and began to decrease only during the fourth week of response. 
Health
The buildings destroyed by the earthquake included at least 8 of the 13 existing Bottlenecks regarding emergency medical treatment were numerous. There was a lack of medical doctors to cover the unexpected demand and a lack of medical facilities due to the collapse of hospitals. Electricity, medical supplies, and warehouse space for the shipments being received from abroad were also lacking, and there were significant security issues.
Following the earthquake, the reaction of survival medical personnel already on the ground was immediate. MSF reported treating about 600 people during the first day of response. The ICRC deployed their prepositioned medical stock to operational hospitals between January 13 th and January 14 th . Nevertheless, the demand overwhelmed these scarce resources.
The international humanitarian response to the lack of medical doctors and facilities was also rapid. By January 17 th , 7 field hospitals had been established in Starting the second week of response, an additional operational objective consisted of avoiding the spread of diseases like diarrhea and cholera as well as the spread of HIV. This was due to the fact that many of the 130,000 people living with HIV in the country had probably been wounded and/or were migrating to rural areas.
According to MSF, psychological trauma was another source of concern affecting half of the patients in hospitals.
Water, sanitation and hygiene
The daily demand for water, including hospitals and clinics in Haiti was estimated to 
Food aid
On January 13 th WFP, the logistics cluster lead, estimated an initial demand of food for 2 million people. The needs consisted of 14 000 metric tons of ready to eat food and 160 metric tons of high energy biscuits for a 7 day time horizon. The multicommodity, multi-modal network flow problem had the operational objectives of maximizing demand fulfillment and minimizing time of response. Some of the decision problems faced by the relief operation were: 1) how to transport the required amount of food to Haiti; 2) what warehouses to use to stock food items; 3) how many final distribution points to use; and 4) where to locate the distribution points to optimize the trade-off of coverage vs. security.
With the prepositioned food items buried under debris, the closest feasible supply points were the UNHRD in Panama and the WFP satellite logistics hub in El
Salvador. Given the bottlenecks of lack of fueling capacity in Haiti, as well as the limited capacity of the Haiti airport, aircraft had to plan at least one hour of holding fuel and extra fuel for a return trip (OCHA 15/01/2010). Plane selection, scheduling, routing and the optimal balance between fuel and cargo were complex operational problems.
On January 13 th WFP airlifted 86 metric tons of high-energy biscuits (enough for half a million emergency meals) from El Salvador. WFP began delivering food on January 13 th from a distribution point next to the airport; this reached 3,000 people.
Security problems starting on January 14 th imposed a binding constraint. Military escorts would be required for food distribution. On January 15 th WFP distributed food to 13,000 people and given the difficulties of access adjusted its goal to assist 1 million people in 15 days.
On January 19 th the total number of people fed by WFP and other members of the food cluster was 330, 000 (OCHA 17/01/2010). On February 11 th , one month after the earthquake, the total number of people receiving varying levels of food coverage was above 2.3 million (OCHA/11/02/2010).
Shelter and non food items
The demand for emergency shelter in the wake of the earthquake was estimated at 700,000 people (IFRC 09/02/2010). The shelter cluster, led by IOM, was activated with the operational objective of meeting the total demand with emergency shelter and access to non-food items including tarpaulins, plastic sheeting, jerry cans, water containers, and some shelter material. The second phase of the response consisted of camp management for more than 800, 000 internally displaced people migrating to safer areas of the country (OCHA 14/01/2010). In this aspect of the response, the main decision problems were: 1) how to maximize demand coverage while minimizing time of response; 2) how to determine the optimal size of the camps; 3)
where to locate the main camps; and 4) how many camps to set up.
The main bottlenecks in terms of shelter and non-food items faced by the relief operation during the immediate response phase were a lack of stock, lack of transportation, lack of staff for distribution, and security issues. (OCHA 16/01/2010).
On January 14 th with a sufficient prepositioned stock to assist 10,000 families with non-food items, and a target group of 200,000 families, the IFRC and IOM began the distribution. During the immediate response IOM delivered 240,600 aqua tabs, 3,300 jerry cans and 1,920 hygiene kits in Port-au-Prince. Equally, the organization carried out assessments on181 potential sites for camps finding that only one of them had permanent access to water. In conjunction with the distribution of the items mentioned above, the shelter cluster distributed over 49,000 tarps, 23,000 family size tents, 26,500 kitchen sets, 83,000 hygiene kits, 79,500 blankets and 10,300 mosquito nets during the first month (OCHA 11/02/2010). On February 11 th there were 400,000 plastic sheets in stock and in the pipeline.
Security
Difficulties to access those in need increased lead times in last mile distribution.
Without access to reliable information, the delays in aid delivery created anxiety amongst the Haitian people to the point that security became the main bottleneck to aid distribution by the end of the first week. The first security incidents were registered on January 13 th . Immediately, the US started planning the deployment of 2,000 marines into Haiti to support the 3,000 MINUSTAH security personnel left to respond on the ground. From January 14 th MINUSTAH decided to provide escorts to those delivering relief goods. US troops and UN peacekeepers also started offering protection to aid convoys travelling from main distribution points starting with the airport. Distribution escorts were maintained during the first month of response.
Given the conditions, the systems used in setting up the humanitarian operation in response to the Haiti earthquake faced multiple problems. Not least of these was the allocation of scarce resources. Table 2 summarizes these problems.
Stage / cluster Main operations research problems First weeks of response Search and rescue (SAR)
1) How to optimally deploy the rescue teams in a vast urban area 2) How and where to transport rescued patients with grave traumatic injuries and urgent surgery needs to maximize their chances of surviving Access and logistics 1) How to prioritize the use of ramp space at the airport 2) How to efficiently plan the use of heavy lifting equipment to clear the roads 3) How to minimize fuel consumption in a road network with uncertain available paths 4) How to prioritize repair efforts to guarantee access by the sea in the presence of dynamic and noisy seaport capacity assessments Health 1) How to allocate scarce medical personnel and limited medical supplies to demand points in an efficient way 2) How to establish mobile open air hospitals provided by different humanitarian organizations in a coordinated way to maximize demand coverage Water, sanitation and hygiene 1) How to prioritize the distribution of drinkable water during the first days of response 2) How to set up a drinking water distribution system to optimize demand coverage given the damages in the water distribution network Food Aid 1) How to transport the required amount of food to Haiti 2) What warehouses to use to stock food items 3) How many final distribution points to use 4) Where to locate the distribution points to optimize the trade-off of coverage vs. security Shelter 1) How to maximize demand coverage while minimizing time of response 2) How to determine the optimal size of the camps 3) Where to locate the main camps 4) How many camps to set up Table 2 : Summary of main OR problems faced during the immediate response phase after the Haiti earthquake This paper highlights avenues where applied OR can have a significant impact in supporting international humanitarian operations. However, determining and finding solutions to the real needs facing humanitarian decision makers can also prove to be challenging. The following section provides recommendations on conducting research with humanitarian organizations, based on over 10 years of experience working with the sector. 
Build trust by building understanding
Humanitarian workers operate in action oriented environments. Rarely do they have time to reflect on and analyze their operations. Investigations into their operations generally come in the form of audits, and they are not in regular contact with external researchers. At all levels of their organizations, the purpose and methodology of OR is unfamiliar. In addition, the researcher is asking them to take time out of their already full schedules to divulge often confidential information for use in a study. These factors combined create a high degree of uncertainty and suspicion in the relationship that needs to be dissipated in order for the collaboration to succeed. 
Learn the language
Humanitarians operate under the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009) . Maintaining this balance is crucial to the effective implementation of disaster response operations. In many cases they operate in regions deeply affected by extreme or prolonged conflict. In every case, they engage with multiple stakeholders from government institutions, to international donors, to local communities. Maintaining clarity and understanding across multiple stakeholders is vital. To this end, humanitarian organizations employ specific terminology.
This lexicon has significant political and practical implications. For example, from the political perspective, NGO, e.g. WVI, is not to be confused with UN, e.g. WFP, which has been established by multiple governments. From a practical point of view, humanitarians use a large number of acronyms. For example, water, sanitation and hygiene is shortened to "WASH", internally displaced people are "IDPs" or a search and rescue team is a SAR.
In order to communicate clearly and effectively from day one, it is vital for the researcher to be familiar with the meaning and use of terms specific to the humanitarian sector. Using terms like customer (beneficiary) or shareholder (donor) immediately creates a lack of clear understanding between the parties and exacerbates the already present divide between the operations researchers and the humanitarian worker. Learning the language is a vital tool to create an atmosphere of trust and openness during the research process.
Respect existing expertise
International humanitarian organizations generally have four levels of operations. Embodied in this work force is a high degree of local and tacit knowledge, heuristics to work under ambiguity and well tested rules of thumb, combined with years of field experience. Although manager and field staff alike may lack formal training in logistics or operations, this is not to be confused with lacking expertise.
Acknowledging this expertise is very important. Listening to the real problems and using OR to develop solutions will be far more effective in the long run than using existing OR models and attempting to force-fit them to humanitarian organizations.
In order to guarantee the relevance of the research, the researcher needs to engage humanitarian experts in the project by keeping them informed as to how the work is progressing, asking for feedback and requesting advice on the applicability of the findings.
Be specific and realistic about your information requirements
Data collection is one of the most salient problems impacting humanitarian organizations today. As Pedraza assert, the problem is not a lack of data but rather the way in which it is compiled. There is little cross referencing between the different formats (excel spreadsheets, archival files or data collection systems) and the systematic use of quantitative data for decision making purposes is rare. Additionally, high levels of bureaucracy within some of these organizations have often resulted in different departments within the organization possessing detailed data on a very limited aspect of an operation. Mountains of paper work exist in offices located in remote villages with seemingly little function other than to provide material support in the event of an audit, i.e. data is often collected for accountability requirements and not for decision analysis.
As a result, demands for extensive data sets pose serious problems to humanitarian workers in terms of time required to track down and compile the information. In a similar vein, excessive demands for data also pose problems as humanitarians may need to consult many people within the organization to obtain the information. The researcher may also confront the same problem when carrying out research interviews. Individuals working in these organizations have a high degree of specialized vertical knowledge regarding their own roles, but often lack broader knowledge of the organization as a whole i.e., organizations function in silos and supply chains are fragmented.
Mitigating this problem is a challenge. The researcher must be specific and realistic about the information requirements. Pinpoint the correct person to speak to regarding a given issue. Don't waste time by either asking for information that can be obtained from alternative sources (annual reports, websites) or asking for excessively detailed data that is not vital to the research. Demonstrate knowledge of the context and operational constraints. Be concise and direct with questions and specific in descriptions of the data set required. Where possible, formulate the questions such that yes/no responses are sufficient. Avoid crowding already overloaded inboxes with last minute demands. Rather, send clear requests much in advance of project deadlines and be prepared to wait a long time for a response!
Gain field knowledge
Humanitarians operate in an atypical context. For many researchers, it is virtually another world. This is one factor that makes research into their operations compelling, but also deeply challenging. As previously mentioned, field workers as well as decision makers have field experience of varying durations. Firm relationships have developed between humanitarians that have crossed paths during a response or ongoing operations, and expansive networks have formed across the sector based on shared experiences, and even shared traumas in difficult and dangerous response operations.
In an attempt to explain the difficult conditions inherent in humanitarian operations a common question posed to the researcher is "have you been to the field?" This may be followed by a reference to "dirt under the finger nails". Having field knowledge increases the credibility of the operations researcher. It helps to remove the "ivory tower" image of research and helps to break down some of the barriers to understanding between the humanitarian and the researcher. At the very least, it broadens the researcher's network of contacts and permits collection of primary data.
When arranging field trips or interviews, researchers need to recognize the difference in planning horizons and be adaptable to the humanitarian way of operating. Prior to meetings provide as much information as possible on the type of information required, and the roles/ responsibilities of the requested interviewees. It is rare to receive a meeting agenda before arriving at the organization. In this respect, it is very important to be flexible. Humanitarian workers have dynamic agendas which they reshuffle constantly. Be prepared to deal with last minute interviews as they occur or last minute cancellations as your interviewee is suddenly mobilized to respond to a disaster.
Give something in exchange and deliver relevant results
Humanitarian organizations operate according to a mandate. As such, their workers are not motivated by profit, by product innovation, or by challenging existing understanding. The main objective is the effective delivery of programs. When entering into a collaborative research project, the main motivation is to increase the efficiency of operations. They must compare the resources that will be required to take part in the project with the value it will add to their work. The researcher has a real responsibility in terms of setting expectations and applying the results. Every resource that is spent on research and implementation is a resource that could be used for program delivery.
In this respect, it is crucial for the researcher, particularly those who wish build a lasting relationship with a given organization, to deliver relevant results as promised. Engaging with the organizations from the design to application of the research is one way to ensure that the real value of OR in the humanitarian context is realized to the benefit of all involved.
Conclusions
Humanitarian organizations face multiple decisions problems and bottlenecks in responding to large scale disasters such as the Haiti earthquake. OR can play a role in supporting international humanitarian operations. This paper highlights areas where OR can have a significant impact.
Current OR literature related to humanitarian operations tends to focus on planning and preparedness of the response or on the optimization of existing response systems. In the case of Haiti, these systems were non-existent or severely impacted by the disaster and required reconstruction. OR literature should also include more research on the immediate response phase. In the wake of high impact disasters, this phase involves search and rescue, assessment, and setting up the response systems.
The humanitarian operation in response to the Haiti earthquake highlights the relevance of applied OR to the field of humanitarian operations, specifically in 4 aspects: 1) on the ground; 2) operational objectives; 3) decision problems and; 4) bottlenecks. On the ground, humanitarian organizations based in Haiti had systems in place, and were prepared to respond to cyclical regional disasters such as hurricanes or flooding. The earthquake on January 12 th overwhelmed these systems, leaving the humanitarian community ill-prepared to cope with the aftermath of the disaster. The operational objectives of humanitarian response operations are to maximize coverage while minimizing time of the response. As the Haiti example illustrated, these objectives are subject to serious decision problems and bottlenecks. It is these two aspects which provide the key areas for application of OR.
In order to be relevant, OR must address the real challenges facing humanitarian organizations. Conducting research with this sector can be challenging. Finally, operations researchers working with humanitarian organizations have a responsibility to manage expectations and deliver results such that time and resources invested by academics and humanitarians can contribute to improving operations.
